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power of the foreign government is strong and the price elsticity of 
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1 Introduction 
Recently, many economists argue that high income countries should prohibit 
the parallel imports of drugs from low income countries. A ban on the par-
allel imports enables the pharmaceutical campany to set different prices in 
different markets according to their price elasticities of demand ("demand 
elasticities based price differentials"). Since demand elasticities are inversely 
related to income, the profit maximizing pharmaceutical campany sets lower 
(higher) drug prices at lower (higher) income countries. This means that the 
differential pricing due to the ban on the parallel imports improves the ac-
cess to the medicine in low income countries. Moreover, it provides a greater 
incentive for a product development to the pharmaceutical campany, since it 
can allow them to capture closer to full social surplus of their product. There-
fore, differential pricing due to the ban on parallel trade is considered to be 
promising ways to improve the access to medicine in developping country, 
and to preserve incentives for R&D. 
However, besides the "demand elasticities based price differrentials" , there 
are many other factors which explains the observed cross national drug price 
differentials. In particular, the governmental price regulation for pharmaceu-
tical products must be crucial. In addition, it is known that the negotiation 
between pharmaceutical camp any and government contributes much to the 
way and the extent of the governmental price regulation. 
Focusing upon the role of the negotiation in the drug price determina-
tion, Pecorino (2002) reexamines the impact of the parallel trade upon the 
pharmaceutical campany's profits and R&D incentives. In his model, one 
monopolist in the home sells in the both domestic and foreign markets with 
identical demand elasticities. In the domestic market, the firm can freely set 
its price, while, in the foreign market, the price is determined by the Nash 
bargaining game between the firm and the foreign government. In the No 
reimport regime (NR regime), since parallel trade is not allowed, the perfect 
market segmentation is possible. Thus the firm charges its profit maximiz-
ing price in the domestic market, while the negotiated foreign price becomes 
lower than in the domestic market. Therefore, this price differentials in the 
NR regime occurs purely due to the negotiation based factor ("negotiation 
based price differentials" ). In the Reimport regime (R regime), since the par-
ellel trade is allowed, the law of one price holds. Thus the negotiated foreign 
price also becomes the domestic price as well ("uniform pricing effect"). In 
this regime, the negotiation results infiuesnces not only the profits from sales 
in the foreign market but also the profits from sales in the domestic markets. 
Thus firm has incetive to bargain harder in the R regime than in the NR 
regime ("strengthened negotiation effect"). 
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These results imply that the allowance of the parallel trade may provide 
the following two competing impacts upon the firm's profits and incentives to 
invest in R&D. First, the "uniform pricing effect" due to the parallel trade 
negatively influences the firm's profits, since it lowers the domestic price. 
Second, the "strengthened negotiation effect" positively influences the firm's 
profits, since it increases the uniform price in the both domestic and foreign 
markets. Then Pecorino (2002) shows that the "strengthened negotiation 
effect" always dominates the "uniform pricing effect". Thus parallel trade 
provides positive impacts upon the pharmaceutical company's profits and 
incentives to invest in R&D. 
These existing studies imply that if the differential pricing is purely de-
mand elasticities based, the parallel trade lowers pharmaceutical innovation. 
However, if the differential pricing is purely negotiation based, the parallel 
trade promotes pharmaceutical innovation. Therefore, in order to extend 
these existing studies, this paper constructs the model which enables us to 
analyze the case where the price differentials occur due to both demand elas-
ticities and negotiation based factors. Then we analyze more extensively 
under what economic environments the parallel trade are more likely to lead 
higher or lower pharmaceutical innovation. This paper extends the model by 
Pecorino (2002) in the following two ways. First, we consider the case where 
each domestic and foreign market has different price elasticities of demand, 
which enables us to analyze the case where the price differentials occurs due 
to both demand elasticities and the negotiation based factors. Second, we 
explicitly formulates the firm's decisions of R&D investment, which is not 
explicitly analyzed in Pecorino (2002). Based upon these two extentions, 
this paper shows that parallel trade may enhance pharmaceutical innova-
tion, when the bargaining power of foreign government is strong and the 
price elsticity of demand in the foreign market is small. 
The strucuture of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set 
up. Section 3 examines the case, when the parallel imports are not allowed 
(NR regime). Section 4 examines the case , when the parallel imports are 
allowed (R regime). Section 5 examines the impact of parallel trade upon 
R&D investment by comparing the results under the NR regiem and the R 
regime. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2 Basic Setup 
We use a simple partial equilibrium model of trade which consists of two 
countries: home (H) and Foreign (F). A firm in the home country produces 
a good of quality s > 0 which can be thought of as a pharmaceutical product 
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and sells in the both domestic and foreign markets. We use a model of 
vertical product differentiation to represent consumer preferences in each 
market. Consumers differ in their tastes for the product quality, but they 
rank quality in the same way. When a consumer of type t in the market 
i = H, F buys a product of quality s at a price pi, his or her utility is given 
by ui = ts - pi. If a consumer does not buy, his or her outside option is 
normalized zero. The type of consumer t is uniformly distributed between 0 
and Ti with unit density. For clarity of the analysis, we only consider the 
case TF S TH and assumes that TH = T and TF = ¢T 0 S ¢ s 1, where 
¢ measures the size of the maximum willingness to pay in the foreign market 
relative to the domestic market. It also measures the value of the price 
elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative to the domestic market. 
Thus the lower value of ¢ implies the higher value of the price elasticities of 
demand in the foreign market relative to the domestic market. 1 
Firm conducts R&D and sets the quality of its product according to a cost 
function C(s), which satisfies C'(s) > 0 and C"(s) > O. Then it manufactures 
and delivers its product in the both domestic and foreign markets. Once a 
product has been discovered, its marginal cost of production is not affected 
by the level of quality. Thus we normalize the marginal cost of production to 
zero. If the home government provides no re-import regime (NR regime), re-
imports of the good back into the home country are not allowed. Thus firm 
can set different price in each market because perfect market segmentation 
is possible in the NR regime. However, if the home government provides re-
import regime (R regime), re-imports of the good back into the home country 
are allowed. Thus firm has to set uniform price in the both domestic and 
foreign market. 
Therefore, the time procedure of the decision making is summarized as 
follows. First, the home government declares a parallel trade regime. Then 
firm decides on the quality levels with which it will endow its product. Fi-
nally, a firm manufactures and delivers the product in each market and sets 
the prices. In the following subsections, we examine the quality and price 
determination process in the both N Rand R regimes. 
IThe price elasticities of demand in the domestic market EH and in the foreign market 
Ep are expressed as follows: EH = s/- and Ep = s ~_p. Therefore, the lower value of ¢ 
implies the higher value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative 
to the domestic market. 
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3 NR Regime 
We first consider the price determination process under the assumption that 
costs of quality development have already been sunk. Since perfect market 
segmentation is possible in the NR regime, firm can set different prices in 
each market. In the domestic market, since the firm has patent protection 
on this product, it can act as a monopolist . Since t is uniformly distributed 
between 0 to T H, the demand in the home is XH(pH) = ST~pH. Thus the 
profits on domestic sales are given by 
rrH(pH) = sT - pH pH. 
S 
(1) 
By maximizing equation (1), with pH, we obtain 
H sT 
PNR(S) = 2' (2) 
rrH ( ) _ (ST)2 NR S - 4s ' (3) 
where PlJR(S) is the price and rrlJR(S) are the profits in the domestic market 
in the NR regime. In order to stress that these values depend upon the level 
of product quality s, we denote them as a function of s. 
The demand and the profits in the foreign market are given by XF(pF) = 
S</>T;pF and rrF(pF) = S</>T;pF pF. If the firm were free to set its price in the 
foreign market, it would charge monopoly price s~T and obtains the profits 
(s~~)2. However, this paper assumes that the price in the foreign market is 
determined by the Nash bargaining game between the firm and the foreign 
government. This assumption is relevant in the pharmaceutical context. 
The foreign government would like to maximize consumer surplus in its 
country, while the monopolist would like to maximize profits from sales in 
the foreign market. The consumer surplus in the foreign country is given by 
CSF(pF) = (s</>T~pF)2. In the absence of agreement, profits and consumer 
surplus are both zero. Thus zero is the threat point for both of the domestic 
firm and the foreign government. Therefore the Nash bargained price in the 
foreign market in the NR regime P}yR is found by maximizing 
(4) 
with pF subject to the condition that XF(pF) ~ 0 and CSF(pF) ~ O. Here 
a reflects the bargaining power of the foreign country. Simple calculation 
yields 
F () (1 - a)scpT 
PNR s = 2 ' (5) 
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rrF ( ) _ (1 - (
2)(s¢T)2 
NR S - 4s ' (6) 
where PJ,;.R(S) is the price and rrJ,;.R(S) are the profits in the foreign market 
in the NR regime. The results here depend very obvious way on a. When 
a = 1, since the foreign government has the all the bargaining power, we 
must have PJ,;.R(S) = ° and rrJ,;.R(S) = 0, which means that profits for sales 
in the foreign market is zero. On the other hand, when a = 0, since the 
domestic firm has the all the bargaining power, we have PJ,;.R(S) = stT and 
rrJ,;.R(S) = (s~~)2 which means that the domestic firm charges the monopoly 
price and obtains monopoly profits in the foreign market. 
In the NR regime, total profits of the firm, which is given by rrTotal = 
rrH + rrF , are 
rr~R(S) + rr~R(S), 
(S~)2 [1 + (1 _ ( 2)¢2], 
(7) 
where rr~~al(s) are total profits from sales in the both domestic and foreign 
markets in the NR regime. Moreover, in the NR regime, consumer surplus 
of home CSfJR(S), social surplus of home SSfJR(S), and consumer surplus of 
foreign CS~R(S) are given by 




rr~~al(S) + CSJJR(S) , 
(S~)2 [3 + 2¢2(1 _ ( 2)], 
(s¢T - P~R(S))2 
2s 




where social surplus of home is determined by the total profits of domestic 
firm rr~~al(s) and consumer surplus of home CSfJR(s). 
Then we consider the quality choice of the firm. Firm will choose its 
quality level S in order to maximize its profit: 
(11) 
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The First Order Condition to this problem implies 
C'(S) IITotal' (s) NR , (12) 
T2 [ ( 2)A.2] _ II~~al(s) 
-1+ I-a 'P - . 4 s 
Let the quality level which solves equation (12) be denoted as SNR, which 
expresses the level of R&D investment conducted by firm in the NR regime. 
Therefore, by substituting this SNR into equations (2), (5),(7),(8),(9) and 
(10), we can obtain the value of prices in the both domestic and foreign 
markets, consumer surplus and social surplus of home, and consumer surplus 
of foreign in the NR regime. 
4 R Regime 
We first consider the price determination process. In the R regime, the 
negotiated foreign price also becomes the domestic price as well, due to the 
ability to reimport and no transportaion costs,. Thus the law of one price 
holds for the good in question: (i.e. pH = pF = p). 
The negotiation between the firm and the foreign government is again 
formulated as a Nash bargaining process. The foreign government's surplus 
from the bargaining in the R regime is C SF (p) and threat point is zero, 
which is analogous to the NR regime case. However, domestic firm's surplus 
changes from II F (pF) in the NR regime to II H (p) + II F (p) - II Ji R (s) in the R 
regime, where IIH(p)+IIF(p) reflects profits in both the domestic and foreign 
markets when reimports are allowed and IIJiR(s) reflects the profits only from 
sales in the domestic market by setting home monopoly price s[. These 
changes in the firm's surplus and the threat points are explained as follows. 
In the NR regime, whether or not a bargaining is reached, profits from home 
sales are always IIJiR(s). Therefore, firm's surplus from the bargaining is 
independent of the profits from home sales. However, in the R regime, the 
firm's profits from domestic market is influenced by the negotiated foreign 
price. As a result, the term II H (p) appears in the firm's surplus. In the 
absence of agreement, the firm can not sell in the foreign market. However, 
the firm can at least obtain profits II Ji R (s) by setting monopoly price s[ 
in the home. Therefore, the threat point of firms in the R regime becomes 
IIJiR(s). This implies that if the condition 
(13) 
does not hold, the firm does not to sell in the foreign market. Taking this 
constraints into account, we obtain the following lemma. 
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Lemma 1 If the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative 
to in the domestic market is sufficiently high to satisfy the condition that 
¢ < v'2 - 1, there exists no incentives for firms to sell in the foreign market 
in the R regime. 
The proof is shown in Appendix A. When the price elasticities of demand in 
the foreign market is sufficiently high to satisfy the condition that ¢ < v'2-1, 
firm would have to set sufficiently low uniform price in the both domestic and 
foreign markets, if it sold in the foreign market. However, profits obtained 
form sales in both domestic and foreign market under this low uniform price 
is smaller than those profits obtained by selling only in the domestic market 
II~R(S). Thus, when ¢ < v'2 - 1, the firm sets its price at s[ and only sells 




PR1(S) if¢< v'2-1. 
(14) 
where PR1(S) denotes the price in the R regime when ¢ < v'2 - 1. Since 
PR1(S) is monopoly price in the home, the condition PR1(S) = P~R(S) holds 
by definition. Thus, when ¢ < v'2 - 1, the total profits in the R regime are 





II~~tal ( S ) if ¢ < v'2 - 1, 
where IIk~tal (s) denotes the profit in the R regime, when ¢ < v'2 - 1 and the 
condition IIk~tal (s) = II ~ R (s) holds by definition. 
Suppose the condition ¢ 2: v'2 -1 holds, the domestic firm and the foreign 
government reach the agreement and the firm sells in the foreign market. The 
changes in the domestic firm's surplus and the threat points dicussed above 
suggest that price concessions by the firm in the R regime are much more 
costly than in the NR regime, because they affect the domestic market as 
well as the foreign market. As a result, we should expect the domestic firm 
to derive a harder bargain in negotiation with the foreign government. While 
this will tend to help firm profits, the lower price in the domestic mamrket 
in the NR regime will tend to hurt firm profits. Thus, the overall effect on 
firm profitability appears to be ambiguous. 
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Thus, when ¢ ~ v'2 - 1, Nash bargained uniform price in the R regime 
PR is found by maximizing 
(16) 
with P subject to the condition that XF(p) ~ 0 and equation (13). Here, 
equation (13) is rewritten as 
where 
sT ~--~--P--4 [1+¢-J(1+¢)2-2]' 
and 
sT ~~~--p - 4[1 + ¢ + J(1 + ¢)2 - 2J. 
Taking this constraints into accounts, we obtain 
where 
sT JX 8[(1 + a)(1 + ¢) + 4(1 - a)¢ - XJ 
PR2(S) if ¢ ~ v'2 - 1, 
x - (1 + a)2(1 + ¢? - 8[a + (1 - a)2¢(1 - ¢)J 
(17) 
(18) 
and PR2(S) denotes the price in the R regime, when ¢ ~ v'2 -1. Thus, when 
¢ ~ v'2 - 1, the total profits IIWtal (s) in the R regime are 
where 




II~~tal (s ) if ¢ ~ v'2 - 1, 
(19) 
y _ [(1 - a2)(1 + ¢)2 + 2(1 _ a?¢(1 _ ¢) + a + (1 - a)(3¢ - 1) JXJ 
4 4 
and II~~tal (s) denotes the profits in the R regime when ¢ ~ v'2 - 1. Ap-
pendix B explains the deduction of equation (18) more carefully. The results 
here again depend very obvious way on a. When a = 1, since the foreign 
government has the all the bargaining power, we must have PR(S) = p, that 
is the lowest price satisfying the participation constraints of the domestic 
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firm. On the other hand, when a = 0, since the domestic firm has the all the 
bargaining power, we have PR (8) = sJ (1 + ¢) which is the monopoly price 
that maximizes II H (p) + II F (p) given the restriction of uniform pricing. 
Moreover, in the R regime, consumer surplus of home C Sf{ (8), social 






where (8T)2 CS~2(8) - 1288 [(1 + a)(3¢ - 1) + VX]2. 
Note that when ¢ < y'2 -1, since the firm does not sell in the foreign market, 
the consumer surplus in the foreign market becomes zero. 
Then we consider the quality choice of the firm. Firm will choose its 
quality level 8 in order to maximize its profit: 
II~otal(8) - C(8). (23) 
The First Order Conditions to this problem imply 
{ 
T 2 rrTotal(s) 
_ _ _ ~R!.b!l,---,-....:. 
- ';'2 - rr>total(s) 
= _ y = --","!R2,------,---,-
4 s 
C'(8) 
if ¢ < y'2 - 1, 
if ¢ 2: y'2 - 1. 
(24) 
Let the quality level which solves equation (24) be denoted as 8Rl (8R2), 
which expresses the level of R&D investment conducted by firm in the R 
regime, when ¢ < y'2 - 1 (¢ 2: y'2 - 1). Therefore, by substituting these 
8Rl and 8R2 into equations (14), (15),(18),(19),(20),(21) and (22), we can 
obtain the value of the price, consumer surplus and social surplus of home 
and consumer surplus of foreign in the R regime. 
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5 The Impacts of Parallel Trade upon R&D 
Investment 
This section examines how the allowance of the parallel trade influences firm's 
incentives to investment in R&D by comparing results in the R regime and 
the NR regime. By comparing the results in equation (12) and (24), we 
obtain the following proposition 
Proposition 1 1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign 
market is sufficiently high to satisfy the condition that ¢ < V2 - 1, 
R&D investment in the NR regime is higher than or equal to in the R 
regime. 
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market is suffi-
ciently low to satisfy the condition that ¢ ~ V2 - 1, 
(a) R&D investment in the NR regime is higher than or equal to in 
the R regime, if n~otal(s) :S n~~al(s) for V s. 
(b) R&D investment in the R regime is higher than or equal to in the 
NR regime, if n~otal(s) ~ n~~al(s) for V s. 
The proof is shown in Appendix C. Proposition 1-1 indicates that the parallel 
trade leads to lower R&D investment, if the price elasticities of demand in the 
foreign market is sufficiently high to satisfy the condition that ¢ < V2 - 1. 
This result is intuitively explained as follows. In the NR regime, as shown 
in lemma 1 , firm has no incentive to sell in the foreign market when ¢ < 
V2 - 1. Thus the frim sells only in the domestic market and obtains profits 
n~~tal(s) = n~R(S). However, in the NR regime, since the firm can set 
different price in different market, there exists an incentive to sell in the 
both domestic and foreign markets irrespective of the value of ¢. Thus the 
firm sets the price ptf R (s) in the home and PI; R (s) in the foreign respectively 
and obtains profits n~~al(s) = n~R(S) + n~R(S). These results suggest that 
the firm will lose its oppotunity to obtain profits from foreign market due to 
the parallel tarade, when ¢ < V2 - 1. Thus the parallel trade lowers the the 
firm's incentives to invest in R&D. 
However, proposition 1-2 inndicates that the parallel trade may not nec-
essarily leads to lower R&D investment, if the price elasticities of demand in 
the foreign market is sufficiently low to satisfy the condition that ¢ ~ V2 - 1 
and the condition n~otal(s) ~ n~~al(s) for V s holds. As mentioned in the 
section 4, since the negotiated foreign price affects not only the profits from 
the foreign market but also the profits from the domestic market, the firm has 
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incentive to derive a harder bargain in the R regime than NR regime. This 
"strengthened negotiation effect" leads to higher total profits in the R regime 
than in the NR regime. Therefore, the condition rr~otal (s) 2: rr~~al (s) for V s 
is more likely to hold. However, in the R regime, the law of one price holds 
due to the ability to reimport. This "uniform pricing effect" leads to lower 
profits in the R regime than in the NR regime. Therefore, the condition that 
rr~otal (s) 2: rr~~al (s) for V s is less likely to hold. These results suggest that 
parallel trade lead to higher R&D investment only when the "strengthened 
negotiation effect" dominates the "uniform pricing effect" . 
In order to further explore the property of our model, we compare the 
results under the NR and R regimes for some values of a and cpo Firstly, we 
examine the case when a = 0 and 1 and obtain the following results. 
Result 1 1. When alll the bargaining power resides with the domestic 
firm (a = 0), R&D investment in the NR regime is higher than or 
equal to in the R regime. 
2. When alll the bargaining power resides with the foreign government 
(a = 1), R&D investment is the same in the NR regime and the R 
reg'tme. 
The proof is shown in the Appendix D. Result 1-1 indicates that the parallel 
trade leads to lower R&D investment when a = O. When a = 0, since all the 
bargaining power lies with the domestic firm, the firm can freely set the price 
in the foreign market. In the NR regime, the firm can set different price in 
different market in both the NR and R regimes. However, in the R regime, 
firm have to set uniform price in every market. Thus total profits in the R 
regime is lower than those in the NR regime. 2 This result implies that the 
parallel trade lowers the firm's profits and incentives to invest in R&D. Note 
that when a = 0, all the bargaining power lies with domestic firms. Thus the 
impact of the firm's strengthened bargaining power induced by the parallel 
trade becomes negligible. Therefore, "uniform pricing effect" dominates the 
"strengthened negotiation effect" . 
Result 1-2 indicates that the parallel does not provide any impacts upon 
R&D investment when a = 1. When a = 1, since all the bargaining power 
lies with foreign government, the foreign government can freely set the price 
in the foreign market in both the NR and R regimes. In the NR regime, 
government maximizes the consumer surplus by setting the foreign price as 
2The situation examined here when a = 0 is the same as the situation examined in the 
well known models of third degree price discrimination such as Varian (1985) and Malueg 
and Schwartz (1994). 
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zero. Thus domestic firm obtain zero profits from sales in the foreign market. 
This means that the total profits in the NR regime equals to the domestic 
monopoly profits (i.e. II~~al(s) = n~R(S)). However, in the R regime, 
governemnt have to set the price which satisfies the participation constraint 
of the domestic firm defined in equation (13). Thus the firm sets the foreign 
price as p, which is also becomes the domestic price. From equation (13), 
when p = p, total profits in the R regime equals to the domestic monopoly 
profits (i.e. II~otal(s) = II~R(s)). These results imply that the parallel 
trade does not provide any influence upon the firm's profits and incetives to 
investment in R&D. Note that when a = 1, all the bargaining power lies with 
foreign government. Thus the impact of the firm's strengthened bargaining 
power induced by the parallel trade becomes significant. Result 1-2 implies 
that the "strengthened negotiation effect" is large enough to cancell out the 
"uniform pricing effect" . 
Secondly, we examine the case when 1> = ~ and 1, respectively and obtain 
the following results. 
Result 2 1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market 
satisfies the condition that 1> = ~, R&D investment in the NR regime 
is higher than or equal to in the R regime. 
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfies 
the condition that 1> = 1, R&D investment in the R regime is higher 
than or equal to in the NR regime. 
The proof is shown in the Appendix E. Result 2-1 and 2-2 indicate that the 
parallel trade leads to lower R&D investment when 1> = ~, while it leads to 
higher R&D investment when 1> = 1. The higher value of 1> implies the lower 
value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market. Therefore, 
the negative impacts of the "uniform pricing effect" becomes smaller as the 
value of 1> becomes higher. 
When 1> = ~, the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market is 
high enough. Thus "uniform pricing effect" dominates the "strengthened 
negotiation effect". When 1> = 1, the price elasticities of demand in the 
foreign market is low enough and equals to those in the domestic market. 
Thus the "strengthened negotiation effect" dominates the "uniform pricing 
effect" .3 
Finally we consider the case when 1> = ~ and ~, respectively and obtain 
the following results. 
3The situation examined here when 1> = 1 is the same as the situation examined in 
Pecorino( 2002). 
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Result 3 1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market 
satisfies the condition that ¢ = ~, R&D investment in the R regime 
is higher (lower) than or equal to in the NR regime, if a 2: &4>=~ 
(a :::; &4>=~)' The &4>=~ is defined as a which satifies the condition 
that f4>=~ (a) = 0, where f4>=~ (a) - 5V25 + 18a + 25a2 - (lla + 27). 
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy the 
condition that ¢ = ~, R&D investment in the R regime is higher (lower) 
than or equal to in the NR regime, if a 2: &4>=~ (a:::; &4>=~)' The &4>=~ 
is defined as a which satifies the condition that f4>=~ (a) = 0, where 
f4>=~(a) - 13V169 + 50a + 169a2 - (27a + 171). 
3. The value of &4>=~ is smaller than the value of &4>=~' 
The proof is shown in the Appendix F. Result 3-1 and 3-2 indicate that given 
the sufficiently high value of ¢, the parallel trade leads to higher (lower) R&D 
investment, when the value of a is higher (lower) than the certain threshold 
value. Moreover, Result 3-3 provides us an insightful intuition that the range 
of a where the parallel trade leads to higher R&D investment becomes wider, 
as the value of ¢ becomes higher. Therefore, Result 3 suggests that the 
parallel trade is likely to induce higher R&D investment, as the values of 
both a and ¢ become higher. 
The intuition behinds these results are analogous to those in Result 1 
and 2. The participation constraints of the firm defined in equation (13) is 
the key driving force that the firm bargains harder in the R regime than 
in the NR regime. The influence of this participation constraints become 
more prominent, when the value of a is high and the bargaining power of the 
foreign government is strong. Consequently, given the sufficiently high value 
of ¢, the "strengthened negotiation effect" is likely to dominate the "uniform 
pricing effect". In addition, as discussed in Result 2, the higher value of ¢ 
leads to the smaller impact of "uniform pricing effect". Therefore, the higher 
value of ¢ lowers the threshold value of a and widens the range of a where 
the "strengthened negotiation effect" dominates the "uniform pricing effect" . 
In order to confirm the results discussed above and obtain more intuition, 
we provide numerical example. For illustrative purposes, we specify the 
functional form of the cost function of R&D C ( s) as 
1 C(s) = fjsf3 {3 > 1. (25) 
Following Valletti (2005), we set the baseline parameterization of the model 
as follows: T = 10, k = 30 and {3 = 3. Then, given these values, we increases 
the values of ¢ and a from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1 respectively. 
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Table 1 shows the difference in R&D investment S R - S N R between the 
two regimes for various sets of the values of cp and a. For later analysis, 
we denote the parameter region of (cp, a) which satisfies cp ::::; 0.4 < V2 - 1 
as case 1. The case1 region is expressed as the shaded area in the light 
gray in Table 1. As shown in Propostion 1, when cp ::::; 0.4 < V2 - 1, the 
parallel trade leads to lower R&D investment. In this region, since the price 
elasticities of demand in the foreign market is too high for the firm to sell 
in the foreign market in the R regime, the parallel trade reduces the firm's 
profits and incentives to invest in R&D. 
When cp 2: 0.5 > V2 - 1, there exists two different regions. One is the 
region where the parallel trade leads to lower R&D investment. The other 
is the region where the parallel trade leads to higher R&D investment. We 
denote the former region as Case 2 and the latter region as Case 3 respec-
tively. The Case 2 (Case 3) region is expressed as the shaded area in the 
strong gray (as the area without shading) in Table 1. Then we can easily 
confirm that the case 3 region lies in the area where the values of cp and 
a are higher than those in the case 2. As discussed in Result 1, 2 and 3, 
when the values both cp and a are lower (case 2), the "uniform pricing effect" 
are likely to dominate the "strengthened negotiation effect". Thus parallel 
trade leads to lower R&D investment. However, when the values of both cp 
and a are higher (case 3), the "strengthened negotiation effect" are likely to 
dominate the "uniform pricing effect". Thus parallel trade leads to higher 
R&D investment. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper extends the model by Pecorino (2002) in the following two ways. 
First, we considered the case where each domestic and foreign market had 
different price elasticities of demand. Second, we explicitly formulated the 
firm's decisions of R&D investment. Based upon these two extentions, this 
paper showed that parallel trade might enhance pharmaceutical innovation, 
when the bargaining power of foreign government was strong and the price 
elsticity of demand in the foreign market was small. 
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1 
Since IIH(p) +IIF(p) = [(1+<t»;T-2P jp, it is the quadratic function ofp. Thus 
IIH(p) + IIF(p) achieves its maximum value of (1+<t>~:(ST)2 at p = (1+!)sT. 
Therefore, the relation IIH (p)+IIF (p) 2: II~R(s) does not hold, if (1+<t>~:(ST)2 < 
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IIXR(S) = (8:;2. Simple calculation shows that this condition can be rewrit-
ten as (1 + ¢)2 :::; 2 or ¢ < V2 - 1. 
Appendix B: Deduction of equation (18) 
Let us define V(p) = [CSF(p)]a[IIH(p)+IIF(p)-IIXR(S)p-a. By maximizing 
equation (16) withp subject to XF(p);::: 0 and equation (17), we obtain the 
following first and second-order conditions respectively: 
_ C SF' (p) IITotal' (p) 
r(p) = a CSF(p) + (1- a)IITotal'(p) _ IIXR(S) = 0 (26) 
, 2 IITotal"(p)(IITotal - IIXR(S)) - (IITotal'(p))2 
r (p) = -a (s¢T _ p)2 +(l-a) (IITotal(p) _ IIXR(S))2 < 0 
(27) 
where the right hand side of equation (26) is defined as r(p). 
After the tedious calculation, equation (26) is written as 
a 4p2 - [(1 + a)(l + ¢) + 4(1- a)¢]sTp + [(1 - a)(l + ¢)¢ + 2](sT? = O. 
Thus we obtain the following two candidates of the optimal interior solution. 
sT ~ PI,P2 = 8[(1 + a)(l + ¢) + 4(1 - a)¢ ± v X]. 
Since 0 :::; ¢ :::; 1 and (1 + ¢)2 ;::: 2 due to ¢ ;::: V2 - 1, we can show that 
X (1 + a)2(1 + ¢)2 - 8[a + (1 - a)2¢(1 - ¢)] 
;::: 2(1 + a)2 - 8[a + (1 - a)2¢(1 - ¢)] 
= 2(1 - a)2[1 - 4¢(1 - ¢)] ;::: 0 
Since CSF(p) is decreasing function of p and P2 :::; PI, we obtain CSF(P2) ;::: 
C SF (PI). Moreover, by substituting PI and P2 into II H (p) + II F (p) - II X R (s ), 
we can show that IIH(P2) + IIF(P2) - IIXR(S) ;::: IIH(PI) + IIF(PI) - IIXR(S). 
Hence we can confirm that the condition V(P2) ;::: V(PI) holds. Therefore, 
P2 becomes the optimal interior solution. Moreover, we can confirm that 
P2 = 8J (1 + ¢) when a=O, and P2 = P when a=1. 
Appendix C: Proof of Propositionl 
From equation (12) and (24), we can find that the condition SNR ;::: (:::;)SR 
holds, if and only if II~%al(s) ;::: (:::;)II~otal(s) for V s. When ¢ < V2-1, from 
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equation (7) and (15), rr~%al(s) - rr~otal(s) = (sJt (1- a)q} ;::: O. Therefore, 
when the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market is sufficiently high 
to satisfy the condition that <p < V2 - 1, R&D investment in the NR regime 
is higher than or equal to in the R regime. 
Appendix D: Proof of Result! 
1) From equation (12) and (24), we can find that the condition SNR ;::: (:S 
)SR holds, if and only if rr~%al(s) ;::: (:s)rr~otal(s) for V s. When <p < V2 -1, 
from proposition 1 the condition SNR ;::: SR holds. When <p ;::: V2 - 1, by 
introducing a=O into equation (7) and (19), we obtain rr~%al(s)-rr~2tal(s) = 
(s~t (1 - <p)2 ;::: O. Threfore, when alll the bargaining power resides with the 
domestic firm (a = 0), R&D investment in the NR regime is higher than or 
equal to in the R regime. 
2) When <p < V2 - 1, by introducing a=1 into equation (7), we obtain 
rr~%al(s) = rr~~tal(s) = (sJ.t. When <p ;::: V2 - 1, by introducing a=1 into 
equation (7) and (19), we obtain rr~%al(s) = rr~2tal(s) = (s;{]2. Therefore, 
when alll the bargaining power resides with the foreign government(a = 1), 
R&D investment is the same in the NR regime and the R regime. 
Appendix E: Proof of Result2 
1) From equation (12) and (24), we can find that the condition SNR ;::: 
(:S)SR holds, if and only if rr~%al(s) ;::: (:s)rr~otal(s) for V s. Note that 
<p = ~ > V2 - 1. By introducing <p = ~ into equation (7) and (19), we 
obtain rrTotal(s) - rrTotal(s) = (sT)2 (1 - a)2 > O. Therefore when the price NR R2 32s - , 
elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfies the condition that <p = ~, 
R&D investment in the NR regime is higher than or equal to in the R regime. 
2) Note that <p = 1 > V2 - 1. By introducing <p = 1 into equation (7) 
and (19), we obtain rr~%al(s) - rr~2tal(s) = - (sJt (1- a)( \.11 + a 2 - 1) :S O. 
Therefore, when the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfies 
the condition that <p = 1, R&D investment in the R regime is higher than or 
equal to in the NR regime. 
Appendix F: Proof of Result3 
1) By introducing <p = ~ into equation (7) and (19), we obtain 




W<I>=£(O:) _ 5V25 + 180: + 250:2 , 
8<1>=£ (0:) == 110: + 27. 
In addition, we can show that 1<1>=£ (0) = -2 < 0, 1<1>=£ (1) = 2 > 0, 
w' do:) = 5(250: + 9) 0 
<1>=4 V25 + 180: + 250:2 > , 
and 
W" _~ (0:) = 2720 3 > o. 
<1>-4 (25 + 180: + 250:2 )2" 
If 0:= 1, we can find that IJ~2tal (s) = IJ~%al (s ). If 0 ::; 0: < 1, the value of 
IJ~2tal (s) - IJ~%al (s) has the same sign as the value of 1<1>= £ (0:). Due to the 
properties of 1<1>=£ (0:), W <1>=£ (0:) and 8<1>=£ (0:) summarized above, we can show 
that there exists a unique &<1>=£ E (0,1) such that satisfies the condition that 
1<1>=£(0:) ::; 0 if 0:::; &<1>=£' and 1<1>=£(0:) ~ 0 if 0: ~ &<1>=£ and 1<1>=£(&<1>=£) = o. 
Therefore, R&D investment in the R (NR) regime is higher than or equal to 
under the NR (R) regime, if 0: ~ (::;)&<1>=£. 
2)By introducing <p = ~ into equation (7) and (19), we obtain 
where 
and 
IJTotal(S) _ IJTotal(s) = (ST)2 (1 _ 0:)1. 7 (0:) 
R2 NR 1024s <1>="8' 
W<I>=~(O:) - 13V169 + 500: + 1690:2 , 
8<1>=~(0:) - 270: + 171. 
In addition, we can show that 1<1>=7.(0) = -2 < 0, 1<1>=1 (1) = 13V388 -198 > 
o 8 8 
, 
W' 7 (0:) = 13(1690: + 25) 
<1>="8 V169 + 500: + 1690:2 > 0, 
and 
W" -1 (0:) = 13[(13)4 - 54] 3 > o. 
<1>-8 (169 + 500: + 1690:2 )2" 
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If a= 1 we can find that rrTotal (s) = rrTotal (s) If 0 < a < 1 the value of 
, R2 NR· - , 
rr~2tal(s) - rr~~al(s) has the same sign as the value of f4>=~(a). Due to the 
properties of f4>=z(a) , 'l14>=.r(a) and 84>=z(a) E (0,1) summarized above, we 
can show that th:re exists a
8
unique a4>=~ ~uch that satisfies the condition that 
f4>=~(a) ::; 0 if a::; a4>=~' and f4>=~(a) ~ 0 if a ~ a4>=~ and f4>=~(a4>=~) = o. 
Therefore, R&D investment in the R (NR) regime is higher than or equal to 
under the NR (R) regime, if a ~ (::;)a4>=~. 
3)From Result 3-1 and 3-2, f4>=£ (a) is monotonically increasing in a 
at V a E (0,1) and f4>=£(O) = -2 < 0, f4>=£(l) = 2 > o. f4>=~(a) is 
also monotonically increasing in a at V a E (0, 1) and f 4>= ~ (0) = - 2 < 0, 
f4>=~ (1) = 13v!388 - 198 > O. Thus suppose there exists :J 6 E (0,1) which 
satisfies the condition that f4>=£ (6) < (»0 and f4>=~ (6) > «)0, we can 
show that the condition a4>=£ > a4>=~ (a4>=£ < a4>=~) holds. By introducing 
a = 0.4 into f4>=£ (a) and f4>=~ (a), we can find that f4>=£ (0.4) = -1.3168 < 0 
and f4>=1 (0.4) = 9.2779 > O. Therefore, we can show that the value of a4>=1 
is small:r than the value of a4>=£. 8 
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